observe that optimal policy proves time inconsistent because of rational expectations. This paper shows that the issue of time inconsistency also arises from fewer policy instruments than targets. Fewer instruments, as is well known, lead to the issue of target controllability (Tinbergen, 1963) . Accordingly, this paper investigates these two long-standing policy issues --target controllability and time inconsistency, using the hybrid new-Keynesian model (Clarida et al., 1999) . This paper finds that to address the time inconsistency issue, policy makers must first address target controllability, and that a proper target level trade-off solves target controllability, whereas a proper relative weight between target stabilizations achieves optimal target variability trade-off and solves time inconsistency. Other main results include the following. This paper derives a necessary and sufficient condition for joint asymptotic controllability of target values. The condition, which we call the long-run target level trade-off equation, is identical under commitment and under discretion. When the time-inconsistency problem does not exist, the central bank must make the same target variability trade-offs as society desires.
Introduction
observe that optimal policy proves time inconsistent because of rational expectations. This paper shows that the issue of time inconsistency also arises from fewer policy instruments than targets. Fewer instruments, as is well known, lead to the issue of target controllability (Tinbergen, 1963) . Accordingly, this paper investigates these two long-standing policy issues, and argues that policy makers must address target controllability before addressing time inconsistency.
In considering the time inconsistency of optimal policy (e.g., Kydland and Prescott [1977] ; and Calvo [1978] ), researchers typically delegate a loss function to the central bank to address this issue, for instance, the conservative central banker of Rogoff (1985) , the inflation contract of Walsh (1995) , the employment contract of Chortareas and Miller (2003) , the inflation target of Svensson (1997) , the nominal income growth target of Beetsma and Jensen (1999) and Jensen (2002) , the price-level target of Vestin (2006) , the consistent target of Yuan, et al. (2011) , and so on. Though the various delegation schemes ostensibly differ and lead to different interpretations, several delegations prove essentially identical. 1 Under the delegated loss function, the central bank operates monetary policy with discretion. As a result, monetary policy is time consistent. The main issue, however, is whether discretionary policy can approximate or even reproduce optimal policy. This paper's delegation scheme makes discretionary policy 1. Yuan, et al. (2011) compare their designed loss function with the loss functions in Svensson (1997) without employment persistence, Walsh (1995) , and Chortareas and Miller (2003) , and show that the four loss functions generate identical results with respect to the policy decision. Svensson (1997) also observes that the inflationtarget-conservative loss function without employment persistence mimics the linear inflation contract in Walsh (1995) .
3 reproduce optimal policy.
The issue of target controllability comes from an older tradition of policy issue (e.g., Kalman [1960] ; Tinbergen [1963] ; Preston [1974] ; and Aoki [1975] ). Brockett and Mesarović (1965) define three types of controllability (reproducibility): point, path, and asymptotic controllability. 2 Point controllability means that policy makers can achieve certain target values at a specified point in time. In practice, policy makers probably desire a stronger notion than point controllability, path controllability. Path controllability means that policy makers can make target variables follow some prescribed trajectories over a certain time interval (e.g., Aoki [1975] ). Obviously, path controllability implies point controllability, whereas the converse generally does not hold. Path controllability plays a growing role in dynamic models of economic policy. 3 Asymptotic controllability means that policy makers can reach the target values at infinity. This paper considers both path and asymptotic controllability, which prove useful concepts in describing the equilibrium paths of target variables.
This paper addresses both issues with the delegation approach by designing the appropriate central bank loss function that determines the central bank's long-and short-run 2 . Brockett and Mesarović (1965) use "reproducibility" instead of "controllability". The terminology
"reproducibility" appears in the engineering literature, whereas the same concept of "controllability" appears in the economics literature. They introduce four rather than three types of controllability: point, locally path, uniformly path, and asymptotic controllability. We here refer to both locally and uniformly path controllability as path controllability. In addition, the literature also calls path controllability, functional or perfect controllability.
3. See, for example, Nyberg and Viotti (1978) , Buiter and Gersovitz (1981, 1984) , Wohltmann (1981 Wohltmann ( , 1985 , Tondini (1984) , and Maas and Nijmeijer (1994) . Besides extending Tinbergen's "static controllability" to dynamic controllability (Preston [1974] ), the literature extends controllability from one-decision-maker to multipledecision-makers (game) context. See , Acocella et al. ( , 2007 , and Hughes Hallett et al. (2010 Hallett et al. ( , 2012 for controllability in a game context. 4 target values of inflation and output as well as the relative weight between stabilizing inflation and output. Intuitively, a proper target value trade-off solves the issue of target controllability, and a proper weight achieves optimal target stabilization trade-off and solves time inconsistency.
The delegated long-and short-run target values and weight parameter play roles as follows. The long-run target values guide monetary policy towards a correct end, resulting in asymptotic controllability and eliminating the constant average inflation bias. 4 Though the central bank, using discretion, moves toward a correct end, it still deviates from the optimal equilibrium paths during the evolution toward the correct end, causing a welfare loss. The short-run target values further bind monetary policy to follow the optimal equilibrium paths, resulting in path controllability and removing state-contingent inflation bias. The relative weight eliminates the stabilization bias, making the target stabilization trade-off with discretion under the central bank loss function replicate the target stabilization trade-off with commitment under the social loss function. As a result, the three biases disappear. Discretionary policy under the central bank loss function replicates optimal policy under the social loss function. Meanwhile, the central bank achieves the delegated target values, establishing monetary policy credibility.
The paper unfolds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set the stage for our analysis in sections 4, 5, and 6. Section 2 determines both optimal and discretionary equilibrium paths of target variables in a hybrid new-Keynesian model, given a social loss function. Section 3 summarizes the results of Section 2 in a proposition, the necessary and sufficient condition for joint 4. See Svensson (1997) for the three biases -the constant average inflation bias, the state-contingent inflation bias, and the stabilization bias. 5 asymptotic controllability of target values with commitment and with discretion. Section 4 develops an approach to solve both target controllability and time inconsistency by designing the central bank loss function. Section 5 concretely designs central bank loss functions for the hybrid new-Keynesian model, using the approach in Section 4. Section 6 discusses the delegated weight to deepen our understanding of time inconsistency. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Optimal policy and discretionary policy
To develop our analysis, we simply adopt the hybrid new-Keynesian model in Clarida et al. (1999) without much description. The model combines the possibility of inflation expectations and inflation inertia, and reduces to a purely forward-looking or a purely backward-looking model by choosing the extreme values of the parameter that indexes expectations across the forward-and backward-looking dimensions. See Clarida et al. (1999) for more details.
The social intertemporal loss function equals 0 0
where  (0 < < 1) is the discount factor and E is the expectations operator. The period loss function equals the following:
where  is the inflation rate, x is the output gap between the actual and natural output levels,  * is the socially desirable inflation rate, x * is the gap between the efficient and natural levels, and  is the social weight on output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization around their respective target values. Generally, imperfections and/or distortions exist, and, thus, we assume 6 that * 0 x  .
Aggregate supply equals an expectations-augmented Phillips curve with forward-looking expectations and endogenous inflation
where  ( >0) is the sensitivity of the inflation rate to the output gap,  indexes the degree of lagged versus expected future inflation rates, and u t is a cost-push shock that follows an AR (1) process, 
Combining the first-order conditions (4a) 
where is a root of the characteristic equation
  11
ss ss
For the purely forward-looking, new-Keynesian model (= 0), the solution in Eqs. (5a) and (5b) reduces to the solution in Clarida et al. (1999 Clarida et al. ( , 1703 Clarida et al. ( -1704 We discuss two interesting parameters, which are important for designing the delegation mechanism. First, Eqs. (6a), (6b), and (6c) determine, what we call, the system convergence persistence, . We cannot determine whether a root 
Accordingly, whether the Phillips curve exhibits principally forward-or backward-looking behavior depends on the three dynamic parameters, ,  and , rather than merely .
Time inconsistency
The first-order conditions (4a) and (4b) suggest the time inconsistency of the optimal solution.
Optimal policy requires that the present period follows condition (4a) and that future periods follow condition (4b). In practice, however, the central bank re-minimizes the loss function each period and, thus, always follows condition (4a).
Target controllability
In addition to time inconsistency, optimal policy still faces target controllability. We adopt optimality from the timeless perspective, 9 and analyze Eqs. (5a) and (5b) for 1 t  . The optimal equilibrium paths of the target variables in Eqs. (5a) and (5b) consist of deterministic and random components. We denote the deterministic components as follows
and random components related to cost-push shocks as follows 
Discretionary policy and target controllability 2.2.1. Discretionary policy
The equilibrium paths of inflation rate and output gap under discretion equal 11
where  is the root of the characteristic equation 
Does a less-than-one root exist for the characteristic equation (16a) 
The larger root exceeds one and the smaller root lies between zero and one. The system can converge under discretion when  = 1. When the lag index  goes from 0 to 1, the system changes from divergence to convergence. The system may also go through divergence, convergence, divergence, convergence, and so on.
Target controllability
Similar to optimal policy, the discretionary equilibrium paths of the target variables in Eqs. (15) consist of deterministic and random components. We denote the deterministic components as
and random components or reactions to cost-push shocks as follows
Thus, ss  and ss
x are the steady-state values of the inflation rate and the output gap under discretionary policy.
The ideal social target values of inflation rate and output gap are   and x  whereas the steady-state values equal ss  and ss
x . Similar to optimal policy, the policy maker, using discretion, generally cannot asymptotically control either inflation rate or output gap ( * ss   and * ss xx  ).
Necessary and sufficient condition for joint asymptotic controllability
The 
Target level and variability trade-offs
We summarize the necessary and sufficient condition for joint asymptotic controllability of target values in a proposition. We also show the regressive nature of steady-state values of target variables, and indicate that the constant average inflation bias comes from fewer instruments than targets, rather than from time inconsistency as the literature stresses. In addition, target level and target variability trade-offs correspond respectively to target controllability and time inconsistency, and we argue that policy makers must address target controllability before addressing time inconsistency.
Necessary and sufficient condition for joint asymptotic controllability
The controllability literature usually considers the equations of motion, the available instruments, and the initial state of the system. Rather, we find the necessary and sufficient condition for the joint asymptotic controllability of target values.
Proposition. If the system, with period social loss function in Eq. (2) Proof. We prove the proposition for optimal policy in a more simple way.
Sufficiency. If  * and x * satisfy Eq. (12), then combining Eq. (12) with the Phillips curve produces the Phillips curve around the target values as follows
Now, the optimization problem equals the minimization of the social intertemporal loss function 15 with period loss function (2) 
Target level trade-off (≠)
If ≠0, fewer instruments than the number of targets exist --one instrument and two targets. In this case, target values are generally uncontrollable and time inconsistency exists as we discuss in Section 2. The proposition suggests that if the social target values happen to satisfy the steady-state Phillips curve, they are jointly asymptotically controllable. Joint asymptotic 16 controllability reflects the divine coincidence (Blanchard and Galí [2007] ). 12 Obviously, infinite pairs of target values can lead to joint asymptotic controllability. 
12. Blanchard and Galí (2007) define "divine coincidence" to mean that the stabilization of the inflation rate automatically leads to the stabilization of the output gap, joint stabilization. We borrow the concept here to mean joint asymptotic controllability, focusing on the levels rather than the variability of inflation and output. 
The regressive nature of the steady-state values of target variables explains the constant average inflation bias. An overly ambitious output target value implies a relatively low inflation target value. A low inflation target value leads to the steady-state value of inflation higher than its target value, resulting in the constant average inflation bias. The constant average inflation bias, however, disappears when target values satisfy the steady-state Phillips curve. Therefore, the constant average inflation bias comes from fewer instruments than targets.
Both the literature and we agree that the inflation bias results from an overly ambitious output target value. The reason for the inflation bias, however, is different. The literature stresses that the inflation bias arises from time inconsistency, whereas we argue that the constant average inflation bias comes from target controllability and agree that the state-contingent inflation bias and the stabilization bias do arise from time inconsistency. 18 The proposition suggests that a trade-off exists between target values. A trade-off also exists between target stabilization, as Eqs. (10) and (18) show. Obviously, the target stabilization trade-off under commitment differs from that under discretion, resulting in the stabilization bias, which prevails in discretionary policy. Target level and target variability trade-offs correspond respectively to target controllability and time inconsistency.
Target variability trade-off
In summary, target level trade-off occurs in the long run, independent of policy implementation style --commitment or discretion, as the proposition reveals. The target stabilization trade-off occurs in the short run and depends on the policy implementation style. In addition, the observation that the constant average inflation bias comes from target controllability, rather than from time inconsistency as the literature stresses, implies that the literature mistakes target controllability for time inconsistency. As a result, we address target controllability before addressing time inconsistency, avoiding entangling the two issues when addressing time inconsistency.
An approach to solving both target controllability and time inconsistency
We develop an approach to solving both target controllability and time inconsistency. Intuitively, a proper target value trade-off solves target controllability, whereas a proper relative weight between target stabilizations achieves the optimal target variability trade-off and solves time inconsistency. As a result, we design the central bank loss function by determining the central bank's long-and short-run target values of the inflation rate and the output gap, as well as the weight on stabilizing the output gap relative to stabilizing the inflation rate, given the social loss function and economic structures. The long-and short-run target values and the weight 19 parameter play important roles in the delegation mechanism, as stated in the introduction.
Assume that the central bank operates policy discretionarily.
Joint asymptotic controllability with long-run target values
We denote  b  x b and  b , respectively, the long-run target values of the inflation rate, the output gap, and the relative weight on stabilizing output relative to stabilizing inflation. That is, the central bank period loss function equals 
Since ˆs s  and ˆs s x satisfy the steady-state Phillips curve, they are jointly asymptotically controllable with discretion according to the proposition. That is,
where ss  and ss x denote, respectively, the steady-state values of the inflation rate and the output gap with discretion under the central bank loss function. Actually, we can control ˆs s  and ˆs s x by noting the loss function (25) and the Phillips curve around the optimal steady state, using Eqs. (3) and (14),
which is equivalent to the original Phillips curve.
Moderate and achievable target values, ˆs s  and ˆs s x , establish monetary policy credibility.
Joint path controllability with short-run target values
The desired trajectories of the target variables equal the optimal equilibrium paths,   0, and lim bb t t xx   . That is, we achieve the long-run target values step by step through short-run target values. Two, the short-run target values must evolve with persistence  to ensure that target variables also evolve, on average, with persistence . Three, we must impose predetermined short-run target values. The predetermined target values, though state-contingent, are feasible in practice. We modify the central bank loss function in Eq. (24) as follows:
We specify b t  and b t x so that under the loss function (28) 
With the short-run target values, discretionary policy is path controllable and, thus, eliminates the constant average and state-contingent inflation biases. This leaves the stabilization 21 bias.
Eliminating stabilization bias with a proper weight
We can eliminate this bias by determining a proper weight,  b , such that
where   Now, we design central bank loss functions using the above approach.
5.
Designing the central bank loss function
Joint asymptotic controllability with long-run target values, ˆs s  and ˆs s x
The equilibrium paths of target variables with discretion under period loss function (25) 
where  is a root of the characteristic equation
13. See Eqs. (C.1) and (C.2) in Appendix C. The forms of the solution are exactly the same as those for discretionary policy with social target values,  * and x * , in Eqs. (15) and (16) (6a). With the change of the inflation inertia index , the Phillips curve and the system exhibit different behavior. We discuss the delegations of the short-run target values and the relative weight based on the parameter .
Joint path controllability and elimination of stabilization bias when = 1
The case  = 1 proves interesting. Specifically, if the Phillips curve in Eq.
(3) exhibits purely backward-looking behavior with no expectations as follows: 
With the simple loss function (Eq. 34), the discretionary policy proves path controllable and eliminates stabilization bias! That is,   (optimal system convergence persistence), 
The consolidated first-order condition of the problem under discretion equals 16
Combining the consolidated first-order condition in Eq. (37) and the Phillips curve around the optimal steady state in Eq. (27) 
That is, there exists a discretionary policy, which proves path controllable, and, thus, eliminates the constant average and state-contingent inflation biases. 
Elimination of stabilization bias with a proper weight
where  c is defined in Eq. (8). Though the discretionary solution slightly differs from the optimal solution, the expectations of the intertemporal losses equal each other under the two solutions.
We see that b   when 1   . That is, when = 1, either the long-run or the short-run target values can achieve path controllability, and the weight always equals the social weight. The short-run inflation target value equals the 'weighted' ( 1 1    ) average of the expected inflation rate and the long-run target value. Using an expectation as a target value seems somewhat strange, but we argue that its rationality depends on the forward-looking Phillips curve. Also, the expected inflation target value demonstrates the idea of "implementing optimal policy through inflation-forecast targeting" (Svensson and Woodford [2005] ). We modify the corresponding central bank period loss function in Eq. (25) as follows:
The consolidated first-order condition of the problem under discretion equals 17 In sum, the short-run inflation target value conforms to the macroeconomic structure (i.e., Phillips curve). That is, it is lagged (expected), if the inflation rate in the Phillips curve exhibits principally backward-looking (forward-looking) behavior. We discuss the delegated weight and its interpretation in the next section. In short, with the delegated loss function, a discretionary policy proves path controllable (removing the constant average and state-contingent inflation biases), and eliminates stabilization bias, resulting in optimality.
Discussion on the delegated weight
The proposition solves target controllability. We discuss the delegated weight to deepen our understanding of time inconsistency.
The delegated weight for the purely backward-looking Phillips curve (= 1)
When the Phillips curve exhibits purely backward-looking behavior with no expectations (= 1), the time-inconsistency problem does not exist and neither does the stabilization bias. We, thus, do not need to delegate to the central bank a different weight from that of society to change the trade-off between target stabilizations. Thus,  b = .
When the Phillips curve involves an element of expectations ( 01  ), the time-inconsistency problem and, thus, the stabilization bias exist, and the delegated weight must differ from the social weight ( b ≠ ) to make the target stabilization trade-off with discretion 28 under the delegated loss function equal to that with commitment under the social loss function.
The delegated weight for the principally backward-looking Phillips curve ( c ≤  1)
When the Phillips curve exhibits principally backward-looking behavior ( 1 c  ), the coefficient of the weight  b depends only on the dynamic parameters (, and ), and does not relate to the system convergence persistence, . By Eq. (40),
Therefore, the central bank must exhibit conservatism ( b   ).
Intuitively, if the inflation rate persists ( 1 c   ), then current inflation rate deviation from its target value will persist into future and, thus, cause losses. To reduce these losses, we must place more weight on the inflation rate stabilization (i.e., b   ).
The delegated weight for the principally forward-looking Phillips curve (0 < ≤  c )
When the Phillips curve exhibits principally forward-looking behavior ( 0 c   ), the weight in Eq. (44) depends not only on the dynamic parameters but also on the system convergence persistence. A weight-liberal or weight-conservative central banker may emerge under different circumstances. The evaluation of the weight becomes more subtle because of forward-looking behavior. We see no analytical way to discuss the relationship of the weight with model parameters.
The delegated weight for the purely forward-looking Phillips curve (= 0)
For the purely forward-looking case (= 0), the delegated weight in Eq. (44) reduces to 29 We report the following conditions The central bank is weight-conservative (weight-liberal), if cost-push shock persistence is greater (less) than the critical value,  c . Actually,
That is, a more persistent cost-push shock implies less weight on output stabilization. To see this, iterating the Phillips curve (Eq. 3 or Eq. 27) forward produces
Inflation stabilization depends entirely on current and expected future output gap stabilization and cost-push shocks, because of the purely forward-looking nature of the Phillips curve. Thus, more persistent cost-push shocks imply that more losses occur because more inflation deviation emerges, driven by current and future cost-push shocks. To reduce the losses caused by current and future inflation deviations, the policy makers must place more weight on inflation stabilization and, thus, less weight on output stabilization.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we tackle two issues in policymakingtarget controllability and time In sum, the delegated target values are moderate and controllable, establishing monetary policy credibility. Discretionary policy under the delegated loss function, which replicates optimal policy under the social loss function, proves optimal and time consistent.
Appendix A. Optimal solution
The optimization problem minimizes the social intertemporal loss function (1) 
The first-order conditions equal
Eliminating the multipliers from Eqs. (A.2) gives the consolidated first-order conditions as follows
A. 
